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INCENTIVES TO ADVERTISE AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY:
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BEEF AND BEER
Lynn Hunnicutt and L. Dwight Israelsen

ABSTRACT

There is some debate about whether firms advertise too much or too little. We present a
simple model to examine the incentives of a firm to advertise, and distinguish between the
market-expansion effect and the business-stealing effect of advertising. Firms advertise
homogeneous products (beef) too little relative to the amount that would maximize total industry
profits. The possibility of stealing customers from competitors causes firms in differentiated
products markets (beer) to advertise too much. Finally, we derive conditions that determine
when an expansion in one firm's advertising level increases rival advertising.

INCENTIVES TO ADVERTISE AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY:
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BEEF AND BEER
INTRODUCTION

There is some debate about whether consumers face too much or too little advertising.
Bagwell and Ramey (1994) find that there may be too little advertising in equilibrium, if ads
serve to coordinate buyers and sellers. Nelson (1974) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986) claim
that since advertising itself signals product quality (irrespective of content), there may be too
little advertising in equilibrium. Benham (1972) finds that advertising that is informative
increases competition and reduces prices paid by consumers. On the other hand, Tremblay and
Tremblay (1995) point out that there may be more advertising than is optimal, especially if
advertising is costly, uninformative, or used to sell consumers things they do not need. Dixit and
Norman (1978), and comments by Fisher and McGowan (1979) and Shapiro (1980), show that if
advertising does not enlarge the size of the market, it reduces social welfare.
All of the above papers discuss advertising in differentiated goods industries (i.e., beer).
There is a large literature on what is called generic advertising, focusing mainly on agricultural
products (i.e., beef),l although these papers do not directly address individual producer
incentives to fund generic advertising. Instead, they assume the presence of an agency with
power to tax production and obtain the optimal amount of funding for generic advertising
campaigns. Here, we ask whether individual producers would be willing to fund advertising, in
the absence of such a taxing agency. Generally speaking, the answer turns out to be no. As we
demonstrate below, since the main role of generic advertising is to expand the size of the market,
additional advertising, absent a taxing authority, only the advertising firm bears the cost. This
makes incentives to advertise generic products lower than optimal.
ISee, for example, Freebairn and Alston (2001), Piggott, Piggott and Wright (1995), Wohlgenant (1993),
Kinnucan, Xiao and Hsia (1996), Chung and Kaiser (2000), Kaiser (1997), Kinnucan and Miao (2000), and Schmidt,
Reberte and Kaiser (1997). For book-length treatments of generic advertising, see Kinnucan, Thompson and Chang
(1992), and Forker and Ward (1993).
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We modify a model first applied to worker decisions in collectives and communes to
examine the incentives to advertise. In the model, advertising may increase demand for all
products in the industry (the market-size effect), and/or reallocate demand from one firm to
another (the business-stealing effect). The market-size effect represents an externality created by
the advertising firm for all competitors in the industry. The business stealing effect describes the
shift of demand from one competitor to another within the same industry. Because it is not
present in homogeneous goods industries, generic advertising may increase the size of the
market, but it will not allow one producer to take market share away from other producers of the
same product. 2 We show that when business stealing is not possible, the competitive equilibrium
level of advertising is smaller than that which would maximize industry profits. In contrast,
business stealing is possible in differentiated goods industries. When firms can reallocate sales
toward themselves by increasing their advertising, incentives to advertise are too strong, and the
competitive equilibrium number of ads is larger than that which would maximize industry
profits.
After examining the effect of a firm's own advertising, we look at the effect of
competitors' advertisements. Not surprisingly, as long as generic advertising increases industry
sales (the market-expansion effect), it also increases each firm's profit, whether or not they
contributed toward the advertising. Thus, we have a free-rider problem, and without some sort
of taxing authority, the amount of generic advertising provided will be less than that which
would maximize industry profits. In a differentiated-products industry, as long as the average
benefit to advertising is falling, rival advertisements reduce own profit. That is, manufacturers
in differentiated-goods industries would be better off if their rivals advertised less, while those in
homogeneous-goods industries would be better off if their rivals advertised more.
2Kinnucan, Xiao and Hsia (1996) consider the effect of increased beef promotion on the demand for
chicken and pork. In our partial-equilibrium analysis, these effects are not identical to business stealing. Indeed, if
we consider spending on all goods and assume that advertising does not increase household wealth or income, the
only effect possible is the business-stealing effect.

Finally, we look at the effect offirmj's advertising on firm i's incentive to
advertise, and find that if the business-stealing effect is not present, advertisen1ents are
strategic substitutes. Increased advertiseluents by firm} reduces the n1arginal profit from
an additional ad by firm i, reducing the equilibrium level of advertising firn1 i wishes to
do. In industries where the business-stealing effect is present, the effect is luore
complicated. In fact, the results may be reversed. Especially for dominant firn1s in
concentrated industries, ads are likely to be strategic complements, so that increased
advertising by rivals may increase the dominant firm's incentive to advertise. We
discuss the applicability of this result to advertising for beer, and suggest that the rise of
smaller brewers may have led the industry's major players (Anheuser-Bush, Coors and
Miller) to increase their advertising expenditures.
THE MODEL
This model is related to that presented in Israelsen (1980), which was applied to
work incentives in collectives and communes. Each firm's profit is given by

'1=SiF(A,X)-c(a ) , where
i

Sj

is the firm's share of industry revenue Fe), which depends

on total industry advertising (A) and other industry inputs (X). Profits are reduced by the
cost of the firm's advertising, e(a;. The firm's share of industry revenue (Si) depends on
the structure of the industry, as we will see below.
In the generic advertising case, products are homogeneous, so each firm takes its
share of the market as given and its profit depends only on the number of firms in the
industry. In particular, when products cannot be differentiated in consumers' minds,
advertising done by anyone firm does not affect its share of market revenue. These are
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the "competitive" industries of economics textbooks. In this case, the firm's profit
function is
h

If.
I

1

= - F( A,X)-c(a /. ).
n

For simplicity, assume that the n firms in the industry are identical, so that each of
then1 gets an equal share of industry revenue. To ensure a finite level of advertising, we
assume Fl > 0 ,

Fi 1~O ,and c' (.) > 0 , so that advertising raises revenue but at a

decreasing rate. In this market, firm i's revenue depends on total industry advertising
and the nmnber of cOlnpetitors in the industry .
A second type of industry is one in which products are differentiated, so that
advertising for product i causes consumers to believe that the good is distinct. In this
case, the firm's profit function is given by

In a differentiated-goods industry, firm i's revenue depends both on total industry
advertising, and on its share of that total. Many consumer goods companies face revenue
functions like this one. Microbrewers benefit if their own share of industry
advertisements (a i ) rises, since this will cause those buying larger brewers' brands to
consider switching. Additionally, microbrewers may benefit from their own advertising if
they attract new customers to the market. In fact, increased rival advertising may
increase a microbrewer's sales, since ads by competitors draw consumers to the grocery
store cooler, or to the neighborhood bar, where they may end up purchasing these smaller
brands.

In this industry, advertising has two effects. First, when firm i increases its share
of industry advertising, it is able to attract customers that formerly went to competitors.

r

J.

..

1
d ( -ai ) = 1- 1 aidA
f'C
. bUSIness
.
ThIS
stea 1"Ing eXIsts wlen
-d
- - - IS posItIve. Tlle secon d elect
ai

A

A"

A dai

of advertising is the market expansion effect. This occurs when firm i' s advertising
increases total industry advertising and thus attracts new consunlers to the industry. All
firms in the industry benefit from a positive market-expansion effect, which occurs when
dA / da; ~ 0 . Notice that when market expansion fails,

dA / da; :::; 0 , the business-stealing

condition is guaranteed. If ads by firm i are offset by fewer industry ads, then firnl i' s
revenue rises only because it is stealing some of the industry's existing customers from
its rivals (without increasing the number of customers purchasing in the industry). Also
note that the larger firm i's share of industry advertising, a I. / A , the smaller the response
of industry ads to increases in i's advertisements must be in order for i to steal business
from its competitors. Firms that already do most of an industry's advertising have a hard
time stealing business from their rivals through additional advertisements.
Notice that in homogeneous and differential industries, total profit earned in the
industry is given by

I1=F(A,X)- L c(ai)
i

At the industry optimum, dI1 / dA = 0 , which implies aF = Li de dai . That is,
aA
dai dA
the increase in industry revenue caused by an additional industry advertisement must
equal the total marginal cost of ads. In the private solution, d 1[ / da I = 0 , which might
lead to over- or underinvestment in advertising.

INCENTIVES TO ADVERTISE
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To determine the effect of an increase in generic advertising on firm i's profit,
we use the following first-order condition
h
dn·I

I 8F dA

de

Firm i maximizes its profit by setting d 7r. / da.
1

I

= 0 ,

advertises until the marginal cost of its own advertising,

which in1plies that it

de / da · ,
/

is equal to its share of

incremental industry profit from advertising, (1/ n)(aF / aA)(dA / da j )

.

From the industry's point of view, firm i's ads should be set to satisfy
dTI / dai = (aF / aA)(dA / da i )

-

de / da i =

o· Evaluating the industry's first-order condition

at the privately optimal level of advertising, and assUlning that competitors do not
completely offset additional ads by firm i with reductions in their own
advertising( dA / da i > 0 )3 we have

~: = ~~ -~ : = ~~ ::, (l-~)~O.
So we see that industry profits could be increased if there were more generic
advertising than is privately optimal. Thus, in the homogeneous-goods industry, without
some sort of taxing authority empowered to force each firm to pay for advertisements,
firm i advertises too little.
In the differentiated-product industry, the competitive equilibrium solves each
firm's first-order condition as follows:

3This assumption guarantees that increased advertising by any firm expands the market. This is
certainly true in generic advertising, as this is the only reason for firms to advertise . We believe that it is
also true in most (but not all) differentiated products industries. The alternative (that increased advertising
reduces the size of the market) doesn't seem reasonable for most products, since firms always have the
option of reducing their advertising, and if advertising drives customers away then firms are likely to do so.

d;rf = F(A,X)[l_ ai dA]+
dal

A

A dai

ai~

JF _ dc ..
Adal JA dal

In the homogeneous- goods equilibriUln, the industry benefit of the last
advertisen1ent, JF / JA , was n times larger than its cost. Here, the industry benefit to
firm i's last advertisement may not be n times larger than its cost for two reasons. First,

(a j / A)( dA / da j ) may be larger or smaller than 1/ n.4 If it is larger (that is, firm i
does more than its share of industry advertising), then the industry benefit to finn i' s
marginal ad may be less than n times its cost. The marginal ads of the largest firm in the
industry may actually benefit the industry very little.
Second, firm i's ads may enable it to steal customers from its rivals. If this
business-stealing effect, given by d / dai(a j / A) = [I-aidA / AdaJ / A is positive, firm i steals
business from its rivals when it increases its own advertising. Notice that as firm i
increases its share of industry advertising ( a /. / A approaches one), stealing customers
from rivals becomes increasingly difficult. Industry leaders' advertisements serve mainly
to expand the market, not to steal business from rivals.
As with generic advertising, we can compare the industry optimum with private

firm incentives by evaluating the industry first-order condition at the competitive
equilibrium level of advertisement. Assuming that the industry advertising level changes
no more than firm i's advertisements ( dA / da /.

dfI = (1dai

8F
8A

ai
A

J dA

daj

~ 1 ),

_ F
A

we see that

(1-

ai dA
A dai

J~ 0.

4We will assume that dA / da . ~ O. That is, an increase in firm i' s ads does not lead to a
comp.letely offsetting reduction in ads by/firm i' s competitors. This makes (a j / A)(dA / da ) nonj
negatIve.
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In differentiated-products industries, dI1 / dai
the shape of F(A . X) guarantee that for large enough A,

~ 0,

since our assun1ptions about

8F / 8A - F / A < 0 ' and

I ilnplies that (1 - a I I A)dA I da I. ~ 1- a I.dA I Ada I. · Given the concavity
since dA / da·1 <
of the revenue function F(A . X), firms in differentiated products industries advertise past
the socially optimal level. The ability to steal business fron1 cOlnpetitors gives firms a
larger incentive to advertise than is optimal for the industry as a whole. When firms can
steal customers from one another, each of them advertises too much.

THE EFFECT OF RIVAL ADVERTISING ON PROFITS
To examine the effect of rival advertising on firm i's profit, we look at how ads
created by firm} affect firm i's profit. It is straightforward to show in the competitive
case that d7r: 1 / da i

= (1/n)(8FI8A)(dAldaj) '

which is almost certain to be non-negative

(since the marginal productivity of advertising, 8F / 8A ' is non-negative, and industry
advertising is not likely to fall as firm) increases its own advertising: (dA / da .
.I

~

0) .

Thus, firm i's profit rises as generic advertising paid for by firm} increases. This tells us
that no matter how much it advertises, firm i wishes its rivals to increase their own
advertising. Since the only effect of generic advertising is the market expansion effect,
all advertising for which it pays nothing benefits firm i. In fact, other things equal,
advertising by firm} benefits firm i more than firm i's own advertising, since the effect
on revenue is the same but the cost of the advertising is borne by someone else. That is,
firm}'s advertising is more than a perfect complement for firm i's advertising, from the
viewpoint of firm i.
In the differentiated-goods industry, we see both the market-expansion effect and
the business-stealing effect. The derivative of interest is given by

dJ[~ / da j = (a;dA/ Adaj ) (8F / 8A-F / A) , which is likely to be negative. Assuming that the

average product of advertising FIA is falling, we know the second term on the right-hand
side is negative. As in the homogeneous-goods industry, if advertising by firm} does not
reduce total industry advertising, so that if dA / da . :2: 0 , then drc d / da . ~ O . In
)

I

)

differentiated-goods industries with extensive advertising (such that the average product
of advertising is falling), the business-stealing effect outweighs the industry expansion
effect. In this case, firm i wishes its rivals to reduce their advertising, as additional ads
by finn} reduce i's profit. Advertisements are substitutes, in that more advertising by
firm} reduces the profit that firm i receives.

THE EFFECT OF COMPETITOR'S ADS ON INCENTIVES
Next, we examine the effect of an increase in firmj's advertising on firm i's
Inarginal profit, and thus on firm i's incentive to advertise. In the language of Bulow,
Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985), we are interested in knowing whether
advertisements are strategic substitutes or complements. To examine this issue, we
calculate d 2 J[ I. / da I.da } . . If dA / da I. , is constant, we see that in the homogeneous-goods
industry
2

"t

1[8

2

2

18
2

d
F dA 8F d A]
F dA
da;daj = -;:; 8A 2 da; + 8A da;daj = -;:; 8 2 A da;

~ o.

Thus, an increase in firm}'s advertising reduces the marginal profitability of firm
i's advertisements. The more advertising done by firm}, the lower the marginal benefit
to advertising for all other firms. This discourages firm i from advertising, which
reinforces our conclusion that there is too little advertising in a homogeneous-goods
industry. In homogeneous-goods industries, since the only effect of advertising is to
expand the market (benefitting all firms in the industry), an advertisement paid for by
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firm} is just as effective as an advertisement firm i pays for itself, but less costly.
Advertisements are guaranteed to be strategic complenlents. Increased advertising by a
rival reduces the nlarginal benefit of advertising, without changing its cost.
In differentiated-products industries, the effects are nlore conlplex, because
advertising not only increases the size of the market, it also allows firms to steal business
from one another.
d 2 Hid
1 dA 3F F [
da i
daida j = A dai\ aA - Ajl+ da j

2a i dA
da,

-A

J

ai

+-.4

( dA J2 3 2F2
d a,

aA

It is clear that when dA / da is zero, advertisenlents by rival firnls are neither
I

strategic substitutes or strategic complements. In this case, additional advertisements by
finn) do not affect the marginal profitability of firm i ' s ads, and thus do not change firm
i's incentive to advertise.

If dA / da·1 = 1 , we have
2 d
d tri
daidaj

2
113F
Fj(
2ai J ai 3F
= A 3A --:4 I-A +A 3A 2

This derivative can be either positive or negative. The first part
(1/ A)(8F /8A - F / A) is negative. The third part (a. / A)(3 2F /3A2) is also negative.
I

Thus, if 1- 2a I. / A >- 0 <=> a1
. <- A / 2, we know that this cross-partial derivative is negative
and ads are strategic complements. In this case, an advertisement by firm} serves to
remind customers that the product exists and to reduce the marginal profitability of firm
i's advertisements. Firm i would improve its profit by advertising less and relying on the

business expansion effects offirmj's advertisements. So, if Anheuser-Busch, for
example, increases its advertising, microbreweries will wish to reduce their advertising.
If a . > A / 2 , that is if the firm already has does more than half of the industry
I

advertising, the cross-partial derivative may be positive, so that ads are strategic
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substitutes. Thus, it is possible that when microbreweries increase their advertising level ,
Anheuser-Busch may also need to increase the number of ads it runs, in order to Inaintain
its market position. More advertising by rivals increases the Inarginal profitability of
own advertising for an industry' s largest advertiser. 5
In differentiated industries, increased advertising by firm} reduces the incentive
for firm i to advertise as long as firm i is a minor contributor to total industry
advertisements (a " is less than one-half of the industry total). Only for a dominant firm
I

would incentives to advertise increase in response to increased rival advertising.
CONCLUSION
This paper has examined the incentives of a firm to advertise in both
homogeneous- and differentiated-products industries. Advertising has two effects-it
may expand the market, thus increasing the welfare of all firms in the industry, and it
may induce customers of one firm to purchase from a competing firm instead. This
business-stealing effect is present only when products are differentiated. We show that
when business stealing is not possible, individual firm incentives to advertise are too low,
and fewer ads than would maximize industry profit are produced. This suggests why
many agricultural industries include cooperatives and checkoff programs to purchase
generic advertising designed to expand the market. In differentiated-products industries,
the possibility of stealing customers from a rival increases the incentive of the firm to
advertise, making the privately optimal level of advertising too large.

5While direct evidence ofth"e strategic incentive to advertise is difficult to obtain (as it involves
strategies that firms do not often make public), it is well known that Anheuser-Busch has close to half of
the market for beer in the United States, and is also the industry's largest advertiser. In addition to
increasing advertising, large brewers are moving into the specialty beer niche, buying up smaller companies
but continuing to sell beer under their name.
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Next, we look at the effect of an increase in firmj's advertising level on firm i's
optin1al choice of advertising. In homogeneous-goods industries, we find that an
increase in firn1j's advertising level increases the profit of firn1 i, and reduces the
marginal benefit to firm i of advertising, so that firm i advertises less. That is, generic
ads are strategic substitutes. In differentiated-goods industries, an increase in firn1 j' s
advertising level likely reduces the profit of firm i , but can either decrease or increase the
marginal benefit to firm i of advertising. Hence, in differentiated-goods industries, ads
n1ay be strategic substitutes or strategic complements. For smaller finns (those that
perforn1 less than half of industry advertising) , the Inarket expansion effect dominates,
and advertisements are strategic substitutes. Only for the largest advertisers in a
differentiated industry is it possible that the business-stealing effect dominates, which
makes ads strategic con1plements.
This paper does not make claims regarding socially optimal levels of advertising,
because we have not considered consumer welfare. In both types of industries, the
privately optimal level of advertising is not likely to maximize social welfare, as it does
not even maximize industry-wide profits. Further results are difficult to obtain without
examining the effects of advertisements on consumer utility.
Extensions of this work include looking at the effect of increased industry
advertisements on individual firm incentives to advertise. Especially in homogeneous
goods industries, where private advertisements need to be supplemented by industry
group advertising levels, it would be useful to characterize the effects of a rise in A on the
optimal level of a;. It would also be useful to examine the effect of mergers on incentives
to advertise. When two firms merge, their share of industry advertising will (at least
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initially) rise. Depending on what one assumes about how final shares adjust, one n1ay
see larger or smaller incentives to advertise, which may increase or reduce social welfare.
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ABSTRACT
There is some debate about whelherfirms advertise too much or
too little. We present a simple model to examine the incentives of a firm to
advertise. and distinguish betvveen the l11,arket-expansion effect and the
business-stealing effect of advertising. Firms advertise homogeneous
products (beef) 100 little relative to the amount that would maximize total
industry profits. The possibility of stealing customers from competitors
causes firms in differentiated products markets (beer) to advertise too
much. Finally, we derive conditions that determine when an expansion in
one firm's advertising level increases rival advertising.

INTRODUCTION
There is some debate about whether consumers face too much or too little
advertising. Bagwell and Ramey (1994) find that there may be too little advertising in
equilibrium, if ads serve to coordinate buyers and sellers. Nelson (1974) and Milgrom
and Roberts (1986) claim that since advertising itself signals product quality (irrespective
of content), there may be too little advertising in equilibrium. Benham (1972) finds that
advertising that is infonnative increases competition and reduces prices paid by
consumers. On the other hand, Tremblay and Tremblay (1995) point out that there may
be more advertising than is optimal, especially if advertising is costly, uninformative, or
used to sell consumers things they do not need. Dixit and Norman (1978), and comments

by Fisher and McGowan (1979) and Shapiro (1980), show that if advertising does not
enlarge the size of the market, it reduces social welfare.
All of the above papers discuss advertising in differentiated goods industries (i.e.
beer). There is a large literature on what is called generic advertising, focusing mainly
on agricultural products (i.e. beef), I although these papers do not directly address
individual producer incentives to fund generic advertising. Instead, they assume the
presence of an agency with power to tax production and obtain the optimal amount of
funding for generic advertising campaigns. Here, we ask whether individual producers
would be willing to fund advertising, in the absence of such a taxing agency. Generally
speaking, the answer turns out to be no. As we demonstrate below, since the main role of
generic advertising is to expand the size of the market, additional advertising benefits all
producers. Although everyone benefits from such advertising, absent a taxing authority,
only the advertising firm bears the cost. This makes incentives to advertise generic
products lower than optimal.
We modify a model first applied to worker decisions in collectives and
communes to examine the incentives to advertise. In the model, advertising may increase
demand for all products in the industry (the market-size effect), and/or reallocate demand
from one firm to another (the business-stealing effect). The market-size effect
represents an externality created by the advertising firm for all competitors in the
industry. The business stealing effect describes the shift of demand from one competitor

ISee, for example, Freebairn and Alston (200 I), Piggott, Piggott and Wright (1995), Wohlgenant
(1993), Kinnucan, Xiao and Hsia (1996), Chung and Kaiser (2000), Kaiser (1997), Kinnucan and Miao
(2000), and Schmidt, Reberte and Kaiser (1997). For book-length treatments of generic advertising, see
Kinnucan, Thompson and Chang (1992), and Forker and Ward (1993).
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to another within the same industry. Because it is not present in homogeneous goods
industries, generic advertising may increase the size of the market, but it will not allow
one producer to take market share away fron1 other producers of the same product. 2 We
show that when business stealing is not possible, the competitive equilibriun1 level of
advertising is smaller than that which would maximize industry profits. In contrast,
business stealing is possible in differentiated goods industries. When firn1s can reallocate
sales toward themselves by increasing their advertising, incentives to advertise are too
strong, and the cOlnpetitive equilibrium nun1ber of ads is larger than that which would
maximize industry profits.
After examining the effect of a firm's own advertising, we look at the effect of
competitors' advertisements. Not surprisingly, as long as generic advertising increases
industry sales (the market-expansion effect), it also increases each firm's profit, whether
or not they contributed toward the advertising. Thus, we have a free-rider problem, and
without some sort of taxing authority, the amount of generic advertising provided will be
less than that which would maximize industry profits. In a differentiated-products
industry, as long as the average benefit to advertising is falling, rival advertisements
reduce own profit. That is, manufacturers in differentiated-goods industries would be
better off if their rivals advertised less, while those in homogeneous-goods industries
would be better off if their rivals advertised more.

2Kinnucan, Xiao and Hsia (1996) consider the effect of increased beef promotion on the demand
for chicken and pork. In our partial-equilibrium analysis, these effects are not identical to business stealing.
Indeed , if we consider spending on all goods and assume that advertising does not increase household
wealth or income, the only effect possible is the business-stealing effect.
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